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PREPAID INTEREST-A TAX SHELTER
COLLAPSES: G. DOUGLAS BURCK
In G. Douglas Burck' the United States Tax Court may have
effectively put an end to an era of tax planning through the use of
prepaid interest. The Burck decision is the culmination of a series of
attempts by the Internal Revenue Service to restrict the use of the
prepaid interest tax avoidance device.
Taxpayer Burck kept his records ard filed his income tax return on
the cash receipts and disbursements basis for 1969. On December 29,
1969 he executed a secured promissory term note for $3,000,000
bearing interest at a rate of 7 percent per annum payable monthy. Of
this amount $2,000,000 was loaned to his partnership and $1,000,000
was transferred to his personal account at First National City Bank. The
taxpayer then executed a second note for $2,388,600 with the same
lending institution at the same interest rate and deposited the proceeds
in a non-interest bearing time deposit account at this bank. The follow-
ing day Burck withdrew $377,202 from his personal account at First
National City Bank, an amount representing one year's interest on the
two promissory notes, and delivered it to the lending bank in prepay-
ment on the two notes. On his income tax return for 1969, Burck
deducted this amount as an interest expense. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue disallowed the deduction. The Tax Court sustained
the Commissioner's determination, holding that a material distortion of
income would result and that the Commissioner had not abused his
discretion under section 446(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541
1. 63 T.C. 556 (1975).
2. The remainder of the $3,000,000 was used as follows: $2,350,000 loaned to the
partnership, $100,000 to purchase an interest in another partnership, $150,000 as part
payment on the purchase of a personal residence and $22,798 retained by the taxpayer.
These facts are relevant to the extent that they possibly show a valid business purpose
for the loans.
3. This section concerns methods of accounting:
(a) General Rule.-Taxable income shall be computed under the method
of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his in-
come in keeping his books.(b) Exceptions-If no method of accounting has been regularly used
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in changing the taxpayer's method of accounting to clearly reflect
income.4
The unfortunate aspect of the Burck decision is that the Tax Court
did not go to any length in explaining its rationale for upholding the
Commissioner's determination. Without discussing the taxpayer's argu-
ments, the court relied on two propositions set forth by the Internal
Revenue Service: First, section 446(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
grants the Service the authority to determine whether a taxpayer's
method of accounting clearly reflects income. Secondly, Revenue Rul-
ing 68-6435 is a proper guide for determining whether prepaid interest
deductions materially distort income.
The scope of authority exercised by the Service under section
446(b) is identified in section 1.446-1(a) of the Treasury Regulations
which states that "[tihe term 'method of accounting' includes not only
the over-all method of accounting of the taxpayer but also the account-
ing treatment of any item. ' 6 Relying on this, the court concluded that
the taxpayer had failed to prove that the Commissioner had abused his
discretion in determining that there was a material distortion of income.
In addition, the court regarded several of the factors mentioned in
Revenue Ruling 68-643 as being determinative of a material distortion:
by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the
computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the
opinion of the Secretary . .. does clearly reflect income.
(c) Permissible methods.-Subject to the provisions of subsections (a)
and (b), a taxpayer may compute taxable income under any of the follow-
in methods of accounting-
(1) the cash receipts and disbursements method;
(2) an accrual method;(3) any other method permitted by this chapter; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing methods permitted under regu-
lations prescribed by the Secretary ....
4. There was a second issue in Burck which is not discussed in this note for the
reason that it is well settled. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a) allows a deduction
for interest only if it is actually paid in cash during the year. Clinton H. Mitchell, 42
T.C. 953 (1964). A taxpayer giving his own note in payment of interest is not entitled
to a deduction for the interest covered by the note, since the note is not considered pay-
ment by a cash basis taxpayer. Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940); Nat Harrison
Associates, Inc., 42 T.C. 601 (1964). The rule is the same even if the note is secured
by collateral sufficient to cover it. Jenkins v. Bitgood, 101 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1939);
Frank Kuhn, 34 B.T.A. 274 (1936). The same is true where the taxpayer receives a
discounted note. John C. Cleaver, 6 T.C. 452 (1946); S.E. Thomason, 33 B.T.A. 576
(1935). However, the deduction is allowed if the interest is paid in cash, even if the
cash used comes from the loan and is deposited in a separate, preexisting account.
Newton A. Burgess, 8 T.C. 47 (1947). This was the case in Burck and the Tax Court
so held.
5. 1968-2 CuM. BuLL. 76.
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (a), 1 ED. TAX RE., U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1380
(1976).
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The taxpayer had realized a large capital gain that made his gross
income in 1969 far in excess of that for each of the two prior years; the
prepayment had been made at the end of the year; and one of the
motives of the taxpayer had been the avoidance of income taxes. For
these reasons the court disallowed the deduction and upheld the defi-
ciency assessment.
It has long been settled that an accrual basis taxpayer cannot
deduct interest for other than the year during which it was earned by the
lender.7 However, a cash basis taxpayer has not been so limited, and
this loophole has given rise to its widespread use as a tax shelter. The
leading case is John D. Fackler,8 where the Commissioner disallowed
the deductions on the theory that to permit them would distort income
and that an asset had been created which should have been capitalized.
The Board of Tax Appeals, however, held that no distortion would
result and, without stating reasons, that the concept of capitalization did
not apply. The Board further held that by disallowing the deduction
the effect would be to place the taxpayer on the accrual basis as to one
item and that such a hybrid method was not permissible. Nevertheless,
large scale use of prepaid interest did not develop until all doubts as to
its legality were dispelled in 1945 by Income Tax Unit Ruling (I.T.)
3740 which concluded as follows:
[W]here a taxpayer keeps books of account and files Federal
income tax returns on the cash receipts and disbursements
basis, interest paid in advance for a period of five years consti-
tutes an allowable deduction for Federal income tax purposes
for the year in which paid, but where the accrual basis of
accounting is used in reporting income, interest is deductible
for the year in which the liability to pay accrues regardless of
when payment is actually made.10
With this ruling the use of prepaid interest in tax avoidance
schemes became widespread and reached its peak in the mid-1960s
7. Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., 8 B.T.A. 566 (1927).
8. 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939), acquiesced in, 1939-1 CuM. BULL. 11, acquiescence with-
drawn, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 3. The Internal Revenue Service has the authority to ac-
quiesce or nonacquiesce in any Tax Court decision. See, e.g., 1971-1 CuM. BuLL. 1.
An acquiescence by the Service can generally be relied on by the taxpayer as an indica-
tion that it will adhere to the decision in all future, similar cases. Nonacquiescence,
on the other hand, indicates that the Service will continue to challenge similar facts and
circumstances, even though the nonacquiescence is not binding on the courts.
9. 1945 Cum. BULL. 109.
10. Id. The Ruling gives no indication why a five year period was chosen. It re-
lied basically on Fackler which involved a much shorter period, so the time limit seems
to be purely arbitrary.
,[Vol. 11:442
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when it was common to structure large purchases of real estate using
prepaid interest." It was not until 1968, when Revenue Ruling 68-643
was issued, that the prepaid interest device came under serious attack by
the Internal Revenue Service.
Through the issuance of Revenue Ruling 68-643, the Internal
Revenue Service undertook a reconsideration of I.T. 3740. Recogniz-
ing the abuses that proliferated under it, the Service concluded that it
should be revoked. In addition, the Service withdrew its acquiescence
in Fackler.2 The newly stated policy embodied in Revenue Ruling 68-
643 disallows any deduction for prepaid interest which is not due within
twelve months after the end of the taxable year during which the
payment is made. The deduction of up to one year's prepaid interest is
to be considered on a case by case basis and, if it appears to materially
distort income, will be disallowed. If the deduction is found to distort
income, the Service will change the taxpayer's method of accounting as
to this item and require the taxpayer to allocate the interest over the
term of the loan.'3
The effect of this ruling is to require the taxpayer to adopt a hybrid
method of accounting by placing him on the accrual basis for the
interest item and leaving him on the cash basis for his other accounts.
Under the 1939 Code, there was sufficient authority for the proposition
that hybrid methods were not permitted' 4 and the Commissioner made
no attempts to force their usage. However, section 446(c)(4)' 5 of the
1954 Code appears to permit them if, in the discretion of the Commis-
sioner, they more clearly reflect income.' The burden is on the taxpay-
er, as the court noted in Burck, to show that the Commissioner abused
his discretion in changing the taxpayer's method of accounting, because
in tax cases the determination of the Internal Revenue Service is pre-
sumptively correct. This is usually a very difficult task because the scope
11. See Asimow, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 36, 46 (1968).
12. See note 8 supra.
13. The Revenue Ruling also lists several factors which should be considered in de-
termining whether a material distortion of income would result. See text accompanying
note 25 infra.
14. Case cited note 8 supra.
15. See note 3 supra.
16. Two cases decided under the 1954 Code bear this out. In Dorr-Oliver, Inc.,
40 T.C. 50 (1963) the court refused to allow a taxpayer to switch from a hybrid method
without the Commissioner's consent under section 446(e), reasoning that the hybrid
method already clearly reflected income. In Loyd L Parker, 37 T.C. 331 (1961), the
taxpayer ran two related businesses, both of which were using hybrid methods. The
court sustained the Commissioner's action in requiring one to change to a different
method of accounting.
1976]
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of the Commissioner's power under section 446(b) is quite broad. The
courts have established some guidelines for determining when the Com-
missioner has abused his discretion in refusing to permit or requiring a
taxpayer to change his method of accounting.?1 These may be helpful in
evaluating the Commissioner's action in Burck.
Conformity to generally accepted accounting principles is often
used to see if the Commissioner has abused his discretion.' s Independ-
ent auditors do not recognize the cash basis as a generally accepted
accounting principle primarily because the exclusion of such items as
accounts payable and accounts receivable tend to distort income. A
similar distortion appears when a cash basis taxpayer prepays rent and
insurance, and deduction of these prepayments is expressly disallowed
by the Service and the courts.'" If these distortions are material and
there is a possibility that misleading inferences will be drawn from them,
the accountant will probably express an opinion that a statement does
not present financial position and results of operation. 0 Considering
the fact that an accrual basis taxpayer cannot deduct interest for other
than the year during which it was earned by the lender, a large prepay-
ment of interest would so materially distort income that generally ac-
cepted accounting principles would require an opinion that the accounts
do not present financial position and results of operations.
Another established guideline is the amount of freedom that the
taxpayer has in determining when income is reported or deductions are
taken.2' Undue control by the taxpayer in this area would permit him
to reap the optimum benefit from tax avoidance schemes and delay
payment of his fair share of taxes indefinitely. Related to this idea of
control is the concept of consistency, one of the first terms learned by a
student of accounting. Many taxpayers who use prepayments of inter-
est do so on a one time basis, and this is not consistent with their usual
17. See generally Asimow, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 36,
50-57 (1968).
18. See Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. 275 (1967). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
1(a) (2) (1975).
19. Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942); South-
western Hotel Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S.
703 (1941); University Properties, Inc., 45 T.C. 416 (1966), aff'd, 378 F.2d 83 (9th
Cir. 1967); Lola Cunningham, 39 T.C. 186 (1962); Henry Cartan, 30 T.C. 308 (1958);
Martha R. Peters, 4 T.C. 1236 (1945); George S. Jephson, 37 B.T.A. 1117 (1968); Julia
Stow Lovejoy, 18 B.T.A. 1179 (1930).
20. 1 CCH Am. UNST. CERT. PuB. Accrs. PROF. STDs., pt. AU, § 900.05 (1975).
21. See, e.g., Fort Pitt Brewing Co. v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 6 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954).
f[Vol. 11:442
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habits. Businesses cannot change their accounting treatment of certain
items to fit their tax needs and there is no reason why an individual
should be able to do so. "Consistency is the key and is required
regardless of the method or system of accounting used."2
In addition to the proceeding guidelines created by the courts, one
might consider those established by the Service through the issuance of
Revenue Ruling 68-643.213 Revenue rulings are not binding on the
courts.24 Yet, in spite of their general lack of authoritativeness, revenue
rulings are used by taxpayers for tax planning purposes and often by
courts in support of their decisions. For these reasons one should
analyze the factors recommended in the Ruling as being determinative
of a material distortion under section 446.
The first factor mentioned is the amount of taxable income in the
year of prepayment as compared with prior years. The inference to be
drawn here is quite clear. If a taxpayer's income in the current year is
far in excess of that in prior years, this is a good indication that the
prepaid interest was for tax avoidance purposes and not for any legiti-
mate business reason. A taxpayer, expecting his income to recede to its
normal level in following years, might prepay interest this year to level
out his income and tax. To ease the tax burden on persons with
fluctuating incomes, Congress has provided a tax smoothing device
through income averaging.25 This is the preferred method and nonstat
utory substitutes are generally not upheld.
The amount of the prepaid interest is another factor to be consid-
ered. A large dollar and percentage figure is more likely to distort
income than a small amount and is more likely to be challenged by the
Service. In addition, large amounts generally involve greater deficien-
cies, thus, the Service is more willing to do battle in court when a large
figure is involved.
22. Advertisers Exchange, Inc., 25 T.C. 1086, 1092 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 240
F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1957).
23. This Revenue Ruling has received legislative support. See H.R. REP. No. 413,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1969).
24. The purpose of the publication of revenue rulings is to publish the official
interpretation of the Revenue Service of certain laws as applied to certain
circumstances in order to promote uniform application of the tax laws by
Service employees and to advise taxpayers of the official Service position.
They do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations
but are published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other
cases. They are not binding on the courts.
Andrew A. Sandor, 62 T.C. 469, 481-82 (1974).
25. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 1301-05.
1976]
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Other factors listed are the time of payment and the reason for
payment. Obviously, the latter is important; if a tax avoidance motive
is discovered, the deduction will be disallowed. Apparently, the time of
payment is included because it may reflect motive. For example, a
payment made late in the year suggests that the purpose of the payment
was to avoid federal income taxes.
Even though the court in Burck recognized that Revenue Ruling
68-643 is advisory only and does not carry the force of law, it weighed
the facts and circumstances of the case against the factors outlined in the
Ruling in reaching its decision. The court thereby appears to have
accepted these guidelines as useful indicia of a material distortion of
income resultant from prepaid interest deductions. This contrasts with
the approach taken in an earlier Tax Court decision involving prepaid
interest, Andrew A. Sandor,26 where the court refused to review the
factors listed in Revenue Ruling 68-643. Although the court upheld
the determination of the Commissioner that there was a material distor-
tion of income and permitted the change to a hybrid method of account-
ing ordered by the Commissioner pursuant to section 446, the disallow-
ance of the deduction was grounded upon the analogy between prepaid
interest and prepaid rentals:
We think that the parallel between prepaid rent and prepaid
interest is inescapable. The fact that rental payments are de-
ductible under section 162, whereas interest payments are de-
ductible under section 163, is of little moment. The under-
lying theory which makes prepayments of rent not immediately
deductible is equally applicable to prepaid interest-i.e., the
likelihood that the deduction will result in a material dis-
tortion of income.
Thus, Burck was the first case to give judicial support, even if only by
implication, to Revenue Ruling 68-643 in its holding that a material
distortion would result if a deduction for prepaid interest payments were
allowed. The result for the taxpayer is that he must prorate the interest
over the years due even though it is paid currently.
A tax avoidance scheme that began to bloom with an early Internal
Revenue Service ruling and reached full maturity in the mid-1960s has
now come to an end with the Tax Court's decision in Burck, apparently
endorsing Revenue Ruling 68-643. Unless a taxpayer can show that
an interest prepayment does not distort his income, he will be required
26. 62 T.C. 469 (1974).
27. Id. at 480.
(!Vol. 11:442
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to deduct it in the year to which it applies. Any prepayments of interest
not due within twelve months after the end of the taxable year during
which the prepayment is made will be disallowed. All other payments
will be judged on a case by case basis.
Edward Mysock, Jr.
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